

Radiocaesium in terrestrial and aquatic environments: analogues for Fukushima

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Introduction

- ◆ The damage to Fukushima Dai-ichi by the Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami resulted in considerable contamination: After decay of shorter-lived isotopes, off-site concerns mainly involve radiocaesium isotopes (-134 & -137)
- ◆ Here there is a huge international knowledge base on the environmental behaviour of radiocaesium accumulated as a result of releases over the last half century
- ◆ The SUERC / MCM team have worked in every relevant aspect of this topic, accumulating international, state-of-the-art experience over more than 3 decades

Relevant international “analogues”

Although not widely recognised, there are many situations worldwide that provide valuable experience which can contribute towards planning and implementing Fukushima remediation

- ◆ Major reactor incidents
- ◆ Problematic spent fuel ponds
- ◆ Other major releases of radioactivity
- ◆ Contamination from past radioactive waste disposal activities
 - Releases to land and groundwater
 - Releases to coastal marine environments

Previous reactor incidents

Reactor	Date	Immediate deaths	Environmental effect	Follow-up action
NRX, Canada (experimental, 40 MWt)	1952	Nil	Nil	Repaired (new core), closed 1992
Windscale-1, UK (military plutonium-producing pile)	1957	Nil	Widespread contamination. Farms affected (ca. 1.5×10^{15} Bq released)	Entombed (filled with concrete); being demolished.
SL-1, USA (experimental, military, 3 MWt)	1961	Three operators	Very minor radioactive release	Decommissioned
Fermi-1 USA (experimental breeder, 66 MWe)	1966	Nil	Nil	Repaired and restarted, then closed in 1972
Saint Laurent-A1, France (commercial, 480 MWe)	1969	Nil	Minor radiation release ?	Repaired (decomm. 1992)
Lucens, Switzerland (experimental, 7.5 MWe)	1969	Nil	Very minor radioactive release	Decommissioned
Three Mile Island-2, USA (commercial, 880 MWe)	1979	Nil	Minor short-term radiation dose (within ICRP limits) to public, delayed release of 2×10^{14} Bq of Kr-85	Clean-up programme complete, in monitored storage stage of decommissioning
Saint Laurent-A2, France (commercial, 450 MWe)	1980	Nil	Minor radiation release (8×10^{10} Bq)	Repaired (decomm. 1992)
Chernobyl-4, Ukraine (commercial, 950 MWe)	1986	47 staff and firefighters (32 immediate)	Major radiation release across E. Europe and Scandinavia (11×10^{18} Bq)	Entombed
Fukushima 1-3, Japan (commercial, 1959 MWe)	2011	Nil	Local contamination, extensive on site	Decommissioning / clean-up being planned

Major activity releases from reactors

◆ Chernobyl

- Criticality excursion during tests
- Explosive release of core contents
- Long-term releases during / after responses to control fire / criticality



◆ Windscale

- Core fire during graphite annealing
- Extensive releases of volatile components & water used for fire-fighting



◆ Fukushima

- Core melt and fuel pond damage after loss of power following tsunami
- Responses ongoing



Chernobyl (1986): numbers

- ◆ Total release about 14 EBq: about 50% of this noble gases
- ◆ I-131 about 1.8 EBq
- ◆ Cs-137 about 85 PBq: widely distributed throughout Europe resulting in about 200,000 km² with fallout levels > 40 kBq / m²
- ◆ Sr-90 about 10 PBq, Pu isotopes about 3 PBq: most distributed within 100 km of the reactor (due to association with larger particles)
- ◆ Residual activity contained within the sarcophagus about 500 PBq

1 GBq = 10⁹ Bq, 1 TBq = 10¹² Bq, 1 PBq = 10¹⁵ Bq, 1 EBq = 10¹⁸ Bq

1 Ci = 3.7 × 10¹⁰ Bq ~ 1 g Ra-226

The exclusion zone - containing dispersed core



FIG. 3.8. Surface ground deposition of ^{90}Sr [3.4].



FIG. 3.9. Areas (orange) where the surface ground deposition of $^{239,240}\text{Pu}$ exceeds 3.7 kBq/m² [3.4].

CEZ not related to Cs levels





FIG. 3.6. Surface ground deposition of ^{137}Cs in areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine near the accident site [3.4].

Fukushima releases in context



- ◆ Reactors scrambled days before first venting of RN: greatly reduces shorter-lived radioactivity
- ◆ Predominantly gases / volatiles released, only minor concentrations of less labile RN: wind blowing mainly towards the sea
- ◆ Hydrogen explosions gave only local distribution of slightly contaminated material
- ◆ Local populations evacuated and iodine tablets issued
- ◆ Although melt-through not precluded, core / corium contained within reactor buildings

Fallout in Evacuated Zone has no similarity to Chernobyl: if anything more like that from Windscale reactor fire of 1957



Windscale (1957)

- ◆ Activity releases lower (about 20 TBq Cs-137) but maybe more radiologically hazardous than Fukushima (Po-210)
- ◆ Initial attempt to conceal accident - no evacuation of highest-exposed local populations during maximum I releases and complete secrecy regarding Po-210 (probable main hazard: possibly resulting thyroid cancers)
- ◆ Poor records of operator doses, especially during fire-fighting actions
- ◆ Attempts to flood core resulted in large volumes of contaminated water - initially discharged directly into local river
- ◆ INES rating of 5 in terms of both immediate and long-term environmental impact debatable due to Po releases - but certainly very much less long-distance impact than Chernobyl (INES 7)



Windscale: recovery

Remediation focused on site - no evacuation zone or external clean-up. Releases considerably reduced by filters.

Off-site activities focused on restriction of dose - e.g. restriction of consumption of contaminated milk over an area of 500 km² (especially until decay of short-lived radio-iodine)

Main concern initially capture and treatment of water used to cool core

Once stabilised, reactor core entombed; decommissioning not planned until 2037 (80 years after accident).


Accident effectively forgotten: main area contaminated is major tourist attraction (Lake District).



Other incidents and atmospheric discharges

- A major global source of radioactivity fallout was atmospheric nuclear bomb testing (1945-1980), which released in the order of 2 EBq of long-lived radionuclides. Regional fallout was also important around major test sites (e.g. Nevada Test Site, where over 1000 explosions took place)
- The “Kyshtym” explosion of a high-level liquid waste tank at the secret Mayak site (1957) distributed between 70 - 1900 PBq of radioactivity, leading to long-term contamination of an area of around 800 km² (mainly with Cs-137 and Sr-90)
- Wind distribution of contaminated sediment from Lake Karachay (also Mayak site, 1967) spread about 200 TBq of long-lived radioactivity over several thousand km²
- Hanford releases from reactors / separation plant before filters installed (1944-1947), including around 30 PBq of I-131 and many TBq of longer-lived fission products (Ru-103/106, Ce-144, Sr-90, Pu-239/240)


Global fallout




ATOMIC TEST EFFECTS IN THE NEVADA TEST SITE REGION




UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
JANUARY 1955



NTS fallout



Kyshtym plume



Analogue team support?

SUERC / MCM experience (1)

- ◆ Measurement of Cs-134/-137 in the environment (from bomb fallout, Windscale, nuclear submarines, Chernobyl...)
- ◆ Airborne and surface gamma surveys in contaminated regions and around nuclear facilities: equipment development, intercalibration, use for emergency response
- ◆ Long-baseline studies of trace element mobilisation in the environment (analogues, ka timescale)
- ◆ Modelling of RN (Cs) movement in water, sediment / soil, rock and the biosphere
- ◆ Laboratory measurement of Cs interaction with soils, rocks, microbes, colloids,...
- ◆ In-situ (URL) testing of migration models / databases

SUERC / MCM experience (2)

- ◆ Literature study and review of past radiocaesium contamination incidents
- ◆ Direct involvement in Fukushima contamination assessment and remediation planning
- ◆ Multi-decade involvement in the Japanese nuclear programme and close interaction with PNC / JNC / JAEA
- ◆ Supporting infrastructure for analysis of all other potentially required stable and radioactive isotopes
- ◆ Lead role in development and application of the JAEA advanced Knowledge Management System
- ◆ Communication of technical results to key stakeholders and teaching /training at all levels

Why so much experience in Scotland?


Radio-Cs in Scotland: mid '70s




- Annual Cs releases to sea from the Windscale reprocessing plant similar to total releases from Fukushima Dai-ichi
- Exciting area for young researchers
- Glasgow University / SURRC (SUERC) internationally recognised in this area

Fig. 1 Concentration of ^{137}Cs (pCi l^{-1}) in UK coastal waters, May/July 1972 (from Jefferies *et al.*, 1973).


Radio-Cs in Scotland: mid '70s



- ◆ Radiocaesium profile in marine sediments very similar to Fukushima soil!
- ◆ Models developed to simulate transfer from Windscale to the water and sediment of the Clyde Sea Area (analogue / digital)




Large scale Cs-137 distribution



Radio-Cs in Scotland: now

Freshwater sediment
profile (Loch Lomond)




Chernobyl
1986

Bomb fallout peak
1963

Radio-Cs in Scotland: now



- ◆ Gamma-survey international intercalibration exercise in Scotland

ECCOMAGS Project - RESUME 2002 Exercise. Composite map produced 6th June 2002




Aerial and Vehicular Gamma Survey

- ◆ Unique capability for conducting airborne gamma spectrometry (AGS) and vehicular radiometric surveys
- ◆ More than twenty environmental surveys have been completed in the UK and overseas including studies of the majority of UK nuclear sites
- ◆ Research techniques and calibration procedures including Monte Carlo simulation (20+ years)
- ◆ SUERC has been at the forefront of establishing European co-operation and co-ordinating method development at international level
- ◆ Gamma-ray spectrometer calibration pads



Sampling methods / analysis

- ◆ Experience in all aspects of environmental sampling, including concentration methods for low concentrations in solution and coring in terrestrial and underwater settings.
- ◆ Analytical capacity to determine key supporting information such as sedimentation rates



Communication!

- ◆ There is little doubt that fear of radiation will probably cause more health effects than the radiation itself: **this is a real effect and must be addressed via improved communication**
- ◆ There has been a massive loss in trust and credibility: **this must be regained by government, government agencies and all involved technical groups before meaningful dialogue can be established**
- ◆ Recovery is possible only when communities understand the future cleanup of the environment - both natural and via remediation: **communication should be a focus for all work carried out**



Collaboration options

- ◆ How can we best support recovery of the Fukushima region?



...Hanami in Scotland?